9TH ANNUAL JOAN GILI MEMORIAL LECTURE

Miquel Strubell i Trueta

Bulls and donkeys. National identity and symbols in Catalonia and Spain

The Anglo-Catalan Society
2008
Bulls and donkeys. National identity and symbols in Catalonia and Spain

9TH ANNUAL JOAN GILI MEMORIAL LECTURE

Miquel Strubell i Trueta

Bulls and donkeys. National identity and symbols in Catalonia and Spain

The Anglo-Catalan Society
2008
Bulls and donkeys. National identity and symbols in Catalonia and Spain

In this paper, after an initial discussion about what identity means and how to measure it, I intend to review some studies and events in Spain in which identity issues arise. The conclusion will be reached that identities in Spain, in regard to people’s relationship with Spain itself and with Catalonia, are by no means shared, and the level of both stereotyping and prejudice, on the one hand, and of collective insecurity (even “self-hatred”) on the other, are, I claim, higher than in consolidated nation-states of western Europe, with the partial exceptions of the United Kingdom and Belgium.

Let me from the outset say how honoured I am, in having been invited to deliver this paper, to follow in the footsteps of such outstanding Catalan academics as Mercè Ibarz, Antoni Segura, Joan F. Mira, Marta Pessarrodona, Miquel Berga … and those before them. The idea of dedicating what up till then had been the Fundació Congrés de Cultura lectures to the memory of Joan Gili (Barcelona 1907 - Oxford 1998) was an inspiration. Unlike some earlier Memorial lecturers, however, I was fortunate enough to have a special personal relationship with him and, of course, with his wife Elizabeth. When, a couple of years after moving out to Spain (first to Barcelona, and then to Madrid) with my parents as a child, they decided to send me to boarding school, one of the advantages (they reasoned) of sending me to a school in Oxford, apart from being only three miles from my grandparents’ home on Headington hill, was that the Dragon School was just 50 yards from the Gilis’ home in the Fyfield road, where they were to lived until 1969. I must say that just to know they were close by was indeed a soothing feeling for a ten-year-old sleeping in a dormitory far from home. I still remember eating rather astringent crab apples from the tree (nearly) at the bottom of their garden, and the sweetly scented oranges riddled with cloves that Elizabeth used to make (and perhaps still does!), and the mountains, the piles, the rows of books of all shapes, sizes, ages and values that seemed clutter every nook and cranny of their house. I remember an amazing coincidence: stopping their car one summer as I was strolling along a country road between Castellterçol and Sant Feliu de Codines: on that occasion the whole Gili family motored down from England to their holiday home near Tarragona, along that very road. But above all, I shall always recall feeling like a nestling, snugly welcomed every time I visited the Gili’s home in the Fyfield Road. This, then, is the other reason that I am happy to speak to you today.

Not long ago I delivered a paper in Göteborg (Sweden) at a conference on cultural identities and national borders. The title was: “Language and identity in
modern Spain: square pegs in round holes?”. As the conference delegates seemed surprised, and amused, at much of what I explained and described, I thought I might prepare something for you today on broadly the same subject. However, given the level of complicity, and your familiarity with the general situation in Catalonia and Spain, I intend to develop some aspects of this (to me fascinating) topic further than I did in Sweden.

The word identity is a minefield in itself, because it is used by specialists of different disciplines (several of which don’t really talk to each other – and I myself wouldn’t claim to be above that kind of disciplinary autism) as well as laymen. Moreover, different words are sometimes used to refer to the same concept. Thus what is widely termed “cultural identity” in Europe tends to be called “ethnicity” in North America. So, to put it in a nutshell, one needs to be careful when broaching the topic.

Let me find a pragmatic way out, in order to set the scene and move forward. When in the title of my paper I talk about “national identity” in Catalonia and Spain, I shall adopt the empirical approach that I learned when I read Psychology and Physiology at Oxford. On the one hand, Psychology was taught as an experimental discipline. The idea was that one had to be able to observe and measure behaviour, both human and animal, as well as control variables. So: “Freud? Jung? Never heard of them!” Pathologies had to be explained at the simplest possible level: we are animals, after all, so if our behaviour (instincts, emotions, learning processes, memory, whatever) is similar to that of a lower form of life, there is no need to explain it in terms that only apply to a human. On the other hand, I spent much of my time in the physiology laboratory, dissecting animals or peering into a microscope. Observation then, rather than speculation, will be my approach.

So I shall look at aspects of identity that are behaviours that have been measured and observed. Having said this, much of what I shall say has as its source the results of surveys. This means the behaviour I shall talk about is in many cases self-reported, not actually observed or strictly objective (if strict objectivity exists at all…). Did the interviewee really vote the way he or she said? Does the interviewee really use Catalan as much as he or she says, in a given situation? Nevertheless, it is important to realise that giving an answer is in itself a behaviour, and as such it is valuable, even though it may not be totally (or always) valid. Moreover, in some cases that we shall be looking at, there is a series over time of comparable surveys, and here any trend is probably nearly as interesting as the figures themselves: and virtually certainly closer to true validity than any individual value.
In this paper I shall first paint an overall picture, in identity terms, of the relations between Catalonia (or Catalans) and Spain (or Spaniards). Next, in a section on various symbols, we will look in turn at animals (to do justice to the title of this paper), flags, sport, car number plates and Eurovision. Then in a section on self-identity, I shall deal with cultural attributes, voting behaviour (including a consideration of how voting behaviour is correlated with geographical origin and Catalan language proficiency), and stereotypes.

**Catalonia and Spain**

Non-Spanish researchers and mere observers of the Spanish political scene may be surprised to see the level of acrimony in some aspects of relations between Spaniards and Catalans. Some of these controversial areas involve issues that affect people’s everyday lives in Catalonia: the abundance of toll motorways there, compared to the much greater mileage of dual carriageway freeways in nearly all of the rest of Spain (Torrent 2007a 2007b); the fiscal drain of Catalonia, amounting to a very high percentage of gross domestic product (Pons & Tremosa 2004); the 111 bilateral treaties Spain signed with other countries between 1991 and 2003, forcing their national airlines to use Madrid airport exclusively, and thus forcing Barcelona airport into a marginal position (Portabella 2007); the collapse of essential public services in Catalonia, such as the centralised metropolitan railway service (Calderer 2006, though the brunt of the collapse took place after his article), etc. In this paper we shall look not at such topics, for the author is no specialist in the issues at stake, but rather at various examples of a completely different level, related to issues of identity and symbols. The reader will soon realise, it is hoped, that such issues can give rise to heated debates, and incidents can easily end up in the courts. To illustrate the symbolic level we shall look at animals, flags, sports, and Eurovision song contest; and the results of several research projects on stereotypes, identity and self-identification will, it is hoped, help to provide context for an understanding of the underlying processes.

I haven’t found a better way of introducing in a nutshell the relationship between language and identity in the Spanish context than has Charlotte Hoffmann:

“[C]oncepts of language and identity – territorial, linguistic and cultural – and their attendant issues play a considerable role in public discourse and that they are given conflicting interpretations. At one end of the spectrum are those people (for instance linguists like Gregorio Salvador, 1987) who view language primarily as a tool which becomes all the more powerful as the number of speakers who use it increases. At the other end are those for
whom language is, above all, a powerful symbol of identity. Of course, both views are valid and can be said to apply simultaneously, but to differing degrees depending on the particular circumstances of a language. The conflict arises when languages are in competition with each other within the same territory and the inhabitants of the relevant region do not agree on a common hierarchy of status. [...] What is at the heart of the language issue is that Castilian has the whole Spanish state behind it. This will always ensure its survival. In the case of Catalonia it is uncertain whether the Estado de las Autonomías model, which allows the region to pursue its own cultural and linguistic policies, is sufficient for this purpose” (Hoffmann 2000: 439)

It is not simply a matter of model. Deeper down there is the whole issue of domination and subordination. Fernàndez (2005) draws on Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic domination: “Those who occupy a dominant position impose as legitimate their categories of perception and classification, of vision and division of social reality, and maintain them through the use of symbolic violence” (Fernàndez: 221). This leads to invisibility, “the ultimate form of symbolic violence, as it denies the existence of those who find themselves invisible”. In situations of subordination, the role of symbols may, at least in part, play some kind of sublimation, or of vicarious identity assertion. This would account for some of the acrimony.

It may also be behind gestures like the decision by Aznar to put an end, overnight, to a system of motor vehicle registration which, for over a hundred years, allowed the provincial origin of motor cars to be visible on number plates. The system was dropped, and taking advantage of a design proposed by the European Commission, the “E” for Spain became obligatory inside the number plate (and unlike the more pragmatic and tolerant approach of UK authorities towards the Scots and the Welsh, Catalan car drivers have been fined for covering it with a “CAT” sign). The Spanish Socialist government has not rectified: on the contrary, it has resisted a veritable onslaught in the Spanish Parliament in an attempt to get

A motorbike challenging the “Spain-only” number plates introduced in 2000. [http://adjunts.e-noticies.com/imatges/imatges_20870.jpg]
regional identification back into the number plates (as happened in Italy, for instance): between 2004 and 2007 there were over a dozen questions and motions in the Senate alone, chiefly at the initiative of Convergència i Unió. Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero, the outspoken bandleader for “la España Plural” is recorded in a Catalan-medium digital newspaper as having proclaimed that the change cannot taken place, on account of "problemes tècnics i la dificultat de consens polític per a tirar endavant el procés de reforma de les plaques de matrícula dels vehicles per tal que aparegui el CAT als automòbils matriculats a Catalunya". Moreover, he is reported as having replied that there are “altres impediments com és el que representants del sector de l’automòbil, en general, i dels de la compravenda i lloguer de vehicles, en particular, han manifestat la seva satisfacció amb l’actual sistema de matriculació, així com, l’increment de despeses i tràmits que podria comportar per a Trànsit”.

Symbols

Observant visitors to Spain - and particularly to Catalonia - may be surprised to see cars driving around with stickers on them depicting either a donkey or a bull. The bull has become, over a period of perhaps 30 to 40 years, a symbol of Spanishness. It originated in an advertising campaign by a Jerez-based brandy maker, Osborne, to market its leading product, Veterano. An advertising agency, Azor, designed the bull in 1956 and in the following years wooden bulls were assembled all over Spain, gradually growing from 4 metres to 7 metres and eventually to almost 14 metres in height. In 1988 the Highways Act forced Osborne to remove the lettering from the bulls, and the Spanish government fined them 1,000,001 pesetas on February 4th 1994 for failing to comply with article 24.1 of the 1988 Highways Act as regards a 11·5 m x 5·4 m bull placed 365 close to the Gijón-Avilés motorway, in the northern region of Asturias. In the same year (15th November 1994) the Infrastructures and Environmental Committee of the Spanish Congress of Deputies gave its unanimous support to a motion calling on the government and other public authorities to take measures to ensure the survival of the Osborne bull on Spanish roads, in the context of the legislation on the protection of Spain’s cultural and artistic heritage.
Osborne took the case to the Supreme Court, who on December 30th 1997 turned down the government’s objection and fine on account of what it calls the bull’s “aesthetic or cultural interest”, even though it had to acknowledge that the image falls within the European concept of hidden or subliminal advertising, that is, a verbal or visual exhibition of the brand of a manufacturer of goods or provider of services, with a publicity aim (Directive 97/36/CE). Its reasoning hardly sounds couched in legal terms:

“Even though it may remind some people, indirectly, of the symbol of a commercial firm, the initial visual impact it makes on most people is that of an attractive silhouette, superimposed on the surroundings, which rather than induce consumption, is a pleasure to the eye, reminds one of the ‘fiesta’, and highlights the beauty of the strong animal”.

Following this the bull (of which there are still over 90 in Spain, according to Quílez, 2007) has come to be correlated with a rather aggressive, masculine, primitive Spanish identity, and can be found on cars, shirts, posters, etc. Years earlier, in Catalonia, the wooden bulls had been broken by Catalan nationalists, and it was believed that the last one, strategically placed just by the Bruc tunnel, about 40 km from Barcelona on the main dual carriageway to Madrid, had disappeared once and for all after being destroyed in October 2002 and then broken in half at the end of June 2003. Each time this bull had been reconstructed or replaced (by the brandy firm Osborne).

The last bull in Majorca was reported to have been pulled down by vandals in July 2004, after a number of previous attacks which had been repaired (Cantallops & Nicolau 2004). There was apparently one remaining one in Catalonia, near the town of l’Aldea, which had been hidden for several decades behind a line of fir trees that had probably been deliberately planted in front of it in order to hide it. At the end of July 2005 it was reported that the trees had been chopped down and the newly-discovered bull decapitated and defaced. Since then Osborne rebuilt the Bruc bull in July 2007, but within a few days it was pulled down yet again.

What is it about a symbol such as this that can bring anyone (in Catalonia) to wish to destroy it? And how did the Catalan population react to the increasing presence of the bull as a symbol of Spain?

The answer to the first question would be too complex, probably, to fully explain at this juncture, and might indeed require further research. But the second one has a much more straightforward response which I have already mentioned: the Catalan donkey.
Stickers of this peaceful animal can be found on hundreds of thousands of cars in Catalonia, as a light-hearted and satirical reaction to the Spanish bull. Unless I’m mistaken, it was originally designed by Eloi Alegre as the logo for an Association Afrac (and association for the recovery of the Catalan race of donkeys. In 2004, Jaume Sala and Àlex Ferreiro altered it slightly and started selling it commercially. I doubt they dreamed how successful it was to become. Some people, particularly outside Catalonia, have reacted as if it was a serious campaign (Murillo 2004), rather missing the point in the process.

The Catalans are not the only people in Spain to have deliberately organized a counter-offensive as a reaction to the omnipresent Spanish bull.

The Galicians, whose dairy farms are famous, brought out their Galician cow. On March 6 2002 a Galician football club, Deportivo de Coruña, defeated Real Madrid, in Madrid, and won the Football cup that year (which was their centenary year, moreover). A designer, Antón Lezcano, sold over 200 Galician flags with a cow painted over it, as a reaction to the “ultras”, or rightwing Spanish nationalists (to be more accurate, extremist supporters of Real Madrid). Even the Basques joined in, equally light-heartedly, inventing a sheep, Ardilatxa, representing their own authochtonous strain.

But there are other symbols associated with identity in Spain. One typical one is the issue of flags. What do young Spaniards think about the Spanish flag, as compared to their “regional” one? This question was put to young respondents in a fairly recent study (Moral & Mateos 1999).
The differences between regions are striking. Whereas 56% of youngsters in Madrid and 54% in the surrounding region to the immediate north (Castilla y León) said they identified most with the Spanish flag, only 6% of Basques, 13% of Galicians and 19% of Catalans said the same. In all three of these regions (and especially in the Basque country) the regional flag was clearly more popular.

In case anyone thinks that no-one really attaches much importance to flags anymore, it is worth pointing out that the largest flag in the world was hoisted in a central Madrid square not five years ago. It has been said that no washing machine is large enough to be able to clean it.

This institutional event is in no way comparable to the long-standing sport of burning flags, a pastime that across the world has tended to pick on the stars and stripes.

The Spanish state gives a special place to its flag. A person can be sent to prison for insulting it … or burning it. Perhaps begrudgingly, this sentence can also be applied
if a “regional” flag receives similar attention. Regional and local politicians are also forewarned, should they fail to fly the Spanish flag alongside the regional flag on public buildings they are responsible for (regional ministries, city and town halls, etc.). I might add that hundreds of Catalan local councils fail to obey this aspect of the law. Indeed, an organisation, Un País, Una Bandera\(^\text{17}\), actively promotes the flying of just one flag on town hall buildings in Catalonia: and it seems to have been very successful.

However, it is also illegal (Article 8) to add to the Spanish flag the symbols or initials of political parties, trades unions, associations or private organisations.\(^\text{18}\)

Moreover, the Penal Code lays down severe penalties for insulting the Spanish flag (and those of Autonomous Communities)\(^\text{19}\).

So much for flags. Or not. To link up to the next section, it is worth recalling the outcry in some of the Spanish press when a Catalan motorcyclist (Àlex Crivillé, world champion in 1999) won a Grand Prix on his home circuit, and rode round the course bearing a Catalan flag. I have been unable to find even a single photograph of this on the internet, because I am fairly certain the (Spanish) sponsor did its best to minimise press coverage of this fact, as well as threatening to withdraw its sponsorship should such an “incident” be repeated\(^\text{20}\). So here you have the Spanish flag!

And here is a final example in this section. In 1985 a Catalan team reached the summit of Mount Everest and planted the Catalan flag there, but no Spanish flag. A Spanish nationalist web site, “Libertad digital” (arguably a misnomer) remembered the event 20 years later (Vázquez-Rial 1999), complaining about the absence on that occasion of the Spanish flag, claims to quote Pasqual Maragall, who at the time was Mayor of Barcelona and was later to become President of Catalonia, as having said (in the Barcelona daily La Vanguardia on 28/8/2005): “No había espacio físico ni moral para la bandera española en la cima del Everest. España debería entender que no podemos llevar fácilmente en el corazón la bandera que sustituyó a la nuestra por la fuerza”\(^\text{21}\). (Strong words, strong sentiment. And someone filed them away for fully twenty years before reproducing them in an article. Are flags “just” a symbol?

As can be seen, sport is another powerful means of expressing, and indeed feeling, own’s identity.

This issue, as others of course, is not limited to Spain. Thus, after studying the use of sport by governments to help manage identity Houlihan (1997), concludes that while sport possesses a powerful symbolism that can be exploited on occasion to great effect, the malleability of sports symbolism often undermines its capacity to exert a lasting effect on national identity. Nevertheless, what he has to say about cases in
which sportsmen finding themselves being able – or forced – to play for different national sides, is both interesting and relevant to my paper.

The overlap between British and English identity is clearly evident in sport. While there is only an English soccer team at international level, track and field athletes will compete for England in the commonwealth Games, but for Britain in the Olympics. In soccer the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland have separate teams, but in hockey and rugby union the teams are drawn from all thirty-two counties (Houlihan 1997: 121)

Spain has almost always sought to prevent the Catalans, in particular, from having their own national teams. Take Rugby Union, for instance. The Catalan Rugby Federation was founded in 1922, just a few years after the sport was exported by northern Catalan clubs (that is, in France) into Spanish Catalonia. In 1934 the International Federation of Amateur Rugby was set up in Paris, the members being France, Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and ... Catalonia. The Spanish Federation protested vehemently and managed to join the International Federation thanks to the auspices of the Catalan Federation; but ill will was so great that the Spanish Federation expelled clubs in the Catalan federation from the Spanish league. It took a Fascist dictator to “put things in their rightful place”, from a Spanish nationalist perspective, and have Catalonia expelled from the international federation; and, sad to say, 30 years of democracy have not been enough to restore things to the way they were before the war.

Another sport which is popular in Catalonia is roller skate hockey. Thanks to the good offices of the (Catalan) president of the International Federation, Catalonia had been provisionally admitted to the Federation of Roller Sports in 2004 – and won the world “B” championship in Macau. But in the days leading up to the plenary in Fresno (USA) the Spanish government brought its diplomatic weaponry out to ensure that the ratification of Catalonia’s membership would be rejected, despite the fact that the International Federation is (like all the others) a totally private (and in formal terms, non-political) organisation. Some of its manoeuvres came to light. The representative of the Chilean federation accused the Spanish federation of pressuring the South American countries against the admission of Catalonia: members of the Spanish federation had travelled to South American just two weeks before the FIRS Congress and once there they promised many countries help in exchange for voting against Catalonia. He also claimed that it sent loads of faxes and emails telling them how to vote, under the threat of losing some of the economic help that they provided. The Czech Republic representative also admitted that his federation received pressure from
The Annual Joan Gili Memorial Lecture

the Spanish government. The German representative admitted that she had been contacted by the German politicians responsible for sport, who asked her to make sure she was coming back from Fresno with a "no" against Catalonia. Moreover, a letter from the Spanish Council for Sports (Consejo Superior de Deportes, CSD) to the Colombian federation (and other South American federations) in which they asked for a vote against Catalonia’s admission was also made public. In it the CSD claimed that the recognition of Catalonia would alter the national unity of Spanish sport (!) and would create a bad precedent. In the event the Assembly vote against Catalonia was a farcical manipulation, and was later annulled by the disciplinary organisation of international sport.

How the story ended is of no special relevance. What I am interested in pointing here is that, indeed, States such as that of Spain may be willing do their utmost, at whatever expense, in order to maintain the status quo, and to prevent nationalities from being able to benefit, especially in identity terms, from having their own national teams.

A more successful Catalan sport is Futsal, indoor football. Catalonia was admitted to the International Federation quite recently. Significantly, no Spanish Federation was there to bring its weight to bear against Catalonia’s candidacy. Secondly, the sport is almost totally European, so there was no South American lobby to be mobilised.

So it is perhaps not surprising to know that there is a private organisation whose main objective is to achieve international recognition for Catalan national sports teams, in the respective federations, the so-called Plataforma Pro Seleccions Esportives Catalanes.

I’m sure many of you will remember that the Barcelona Olympics were also the scene for frantic backstage negotiations in the months leading up to the celebration in the summer of 1992. Remember that the Olympic tradition in Catalonia has always been strong, and that in July 1936, when the Olympic Games were to be held in what was be then Nazi Germany (August 1-16, the Berlin candidature having defeated the Barcelona one in 1931) a popular Olympiad was thwarted immediately before its inauguration, by the military uprising. Was Catalan going to figure in a leading position visually, during the ceremonies, alongside the “official” Olympic languages, English and French and Spanish, whose presence was taken for granted from the start? Hargreaves and Garcia-Ferrando (1997) concluded their study by claiming that the Olympic Games “not only polarised relations between Catalonia and Spain, they also served to accommodate antagonism between them and thus to maintain a delicate,
Bulls and donkeys. National identity and symbols in Catalonia and Spain

fragile balance of power in the new “España de las autonomías”. (Hargreaves and García-Ferrando 1997: 65)

So much for sport. Another very interesting area which is related to identity is the Eurovision Song Contest. An interesting study by a group of engineers and physicists (Fenn et al. 2005) looked into the voting patterns of each country. They concluded, perhaps not surprisingly, that there were considerable bilateral correlations in votes between Cyprus and Greece, between Denmark and Sweden, between Ireland and the UK, between Croatia and, oddly, Malta... The “dendrogram” shows the voting clusters within the Eurovision network. As the rescaled distance increases, the clusters become less correlated. Greece and Cyprus, as we have just noted, form the most correlated cluster. Despite the British tendency to feel distant from Europe, their analysis shows that the U.K. is remarkably compatible, or ‘in tune’, with other European countries. Equally surprising is their finding that some other core countries, most notably France, are significantly ‘out of tune’ with the rest of Europe. In addition, the analysis enables them to confirm a widely-held belief that there are unofficial cliques of countries – however these cliques are not always the expected ones, nor can their existence be explained solely on the grounds of geographical proximity.

What I cannot give an opinion on is the Spanish voting pattern therefore, and far less the Catalan one. Andorra is interesting to an extent: it gave it top marks in 2007 to Spain, for whom only one other country gave any votes at all (Albania!). Indeed, according to one internet source 24, Andorra’s votes favour Spain (31%), France (26%) – both immediate neighbours - and Belgium (15%) – a (partly) French-speaking country. Andorra, has on average awarded 6 points to the Eurovision winner, less, say, than Austria (7·3), Belgium (8·0) or Bulgaria (8·5); but more than Armenia (3·5), Albania (4·5), Croatia (4·8), Belarus (5·7), Cyprus (7·3), an very close to Bosnia (7·8).

What Fenn et co-workers failed to consider in their stimulating paper was the possible voting effects of immigrant populations, and this is almost certainly part of the explanation of the large Andorran vote for Spain: a high proportion of the population of Andorra are in fact emigrated Spaniards (followed by the Portuguese). So wherever there are strong, and mobilized, Italian, Turkish or Russian migrant minorities, for instance, we shall expect votes for these countries from the countries where they form a sizeable proportion of potential voters.

Self definition

Let us move on to a completely different issue. How do people define themselves, rather than what symbols do they identify with? An interesting study already
mentioned (Moral & Mateos 1999) gives us a lot of information about how youngsters see themselves in identity terms. When asked what makes a person definable as belonging to one’s region of residence, there are significant differences in the weight or importance people attach to ethnicity, to belongingness or to residence. Thus a fair proportion of young people from Madrid simply expect the place of residence to be enough for someone to define themselves as being “madrileño”. Ethnic criteria are cited by over 10% of respondents in Valencia, Andalusia, Madrid and Galicia, which is interesting because in general it is the Basques and the Catalans that are portrayed by others as being “closed” in on themselves.

A sense of belongingness is highlighted as being a defining feature by a half of the Basques, the Catalans and the Galicians, but barely over a quarter of the Madrid youngsters.

Secondly, youngsters were asked about the allegiances. How did they themselves define themselves? Did they identify only with Spain? More with Spain than their region? Equally? Though in all cases a mixed identification was claimed, it is interesting to see a high proportion claiming to prefer the “regional” identity in the Basque country and, to a lesser extent, in Galicia and Catalonia; while in over 30% of cases in Madrid and in the surrounding region of Castile and Leon, it is the Spanish identity that is chosen.

Thirdly, Moral and Mateos asked their samples how “proud” they were to be Spanish, and the same for their region. Though the questions were separate, a simple comparison is possible: and while in all but one of the regions studied over 80% claimed to be “very proud” or “quite proud” of being from their region, as far as pride in being Spanish was concerned, barely 30% of Basque youngsters, and under 70% of Catalans, did so.

If we look more closely at results from Catalonia, in the same study, intersecting patterns emerge when we break down the sample by, for instance, first language. A dual identity is claimed by only 15% of Catalan-speakers, as against 54% of Spanish-speakers in the sample.

How they see Spain also varies according to their first language, few Catalan speakers describing it as “their nation” or “their country”, unlike Spanish-speakers in the Catalan sample, just over half of whom chose these descriptions.

Let us look in a little more detail at Catalan-speakers and Spanish-speakers in Catalonia. Is the language, when it comes to the crunch, the independent variable, or is it merely correlated with another, more powerful variable?
To answer this we have a more recent study in Catalonia (IDESCAT 2007), commissioned by the Catalan government in which, among other things, it asked about the place of birth of the interviewees’ parents.

**Table 1: Language usually spoken at home and place of birth of subjects’ mothers**
(Source: IDESCAT 2007; items 43 and 38; vertical percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language usually spoken at home</th>
<th>Mothers’ place of birth</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>Rest of Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan</td>
<td>77·9%</td>
<td>20·0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>9·5%</td>
<td>16·0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>10·3%</td>
<td>63·1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other replies</td>
<td>2·3%</td>
<td>0·9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100·0%</td>
<td>100·0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is perfectly clear that the place of birth of the mother (and the same can be said of the father) is a powerful predictor of the language spoken by the (adult) interviewee. 597/ 946 (64%) of interviewees whose mothers are Spanish-born speak just Spanish at home; 622 / 798 (78%) of interviewees whose mothers are Catalan-born speak just Catalan at home.

Note that the place of birth of the subject is not as good a predictor as the place of birth of the mother, because many of those born in Catalonia belong to first-generation Catalan families in which, of course, it would be quite unreasonable to expect a high proportion of Catalan-speaking families in this group (with the exception of a fair number of families of mixed origin).

There is also, according to this study (among others), a clear and strong correlation between one’s self-professed identity and one’s place of birth, as the following table shows:

---

1 In nine cases the mother’s place of birth was not recorded.
Looking column by column, the table shows how closely the place of birth and one’s self-professed national identity are correlated. As might in any case be expected, only 6% of those born outside Catalonia (the calculations have been made on the basis of the Catalan-speaking lands, not just Catalonia) claim to feel more Catalan than they do Spanish. Conversely only 5% of those born within the Catalan-speaking lands (and many of these are first-generation Catalans) claim to feel more Spanish than they do Catalan.

Thus we can hold that identity in Catalonia has an objective basis (geographical and, one might add, cultural origin), and we can safely conclude, then, that there is an ethnolinguistic factor in Catalan people’s self-definition in terms of national and/or regional identity.

But identity goes beyond mere allegiance to symbols. There is one area in which it affects social behaviour, though democracy ensures that such behaviour is secret: voting patterns. The same survey also allows one to see how self-identity affects (self-reported) voting patterns.

Before describing the findings of the survey, readers unfamiliar with the Catalan political scene may find it helpful, in the footnotes, to have some background on each of the six political parties that were voted into the Catalan Parliament on the last occasion (November 2006).
Table 3: Distribution of votes in the last regional elections (2006) by self-identity
(Idescat 2007; items 9 and 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With which of the following sentences do you feel most identified with?</th>
<th>PPC</th>
<th>CIU</th>
<th>ERC</th>
<th>PSC / PSOE</th>
<th>ICV - EUiA</th>
<th>Ciutadans</th>
<th>Null votes / blank</th>
<th>Didn’t vote</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just Spanish</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Spanish and Catalan</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Catalan than Spanish</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Catalan</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First of all, identity has an influence on whether a person takes part in the election or not. It is perfectly clear that most of those who feel “Just Spanish” simply did not vote at all (58.7%), whereas only 24.5% of those who feel “Just Catalan” chose not to vote.

Secondly, there is a clear correlation between self-identity and voting patterns, not just in the decision whether or not to vote. Thus a high share of those who feel Spanish voted for two State–wide parties (Conservatives – PPC- or Socialists – PSC-PSOE) or else for a new Spanish nationalist party founded in Catalonia, “Ciutadans”: 34% of those feeling “Just Spanish” and 45% of those feeling “More Spanish than Catalan”.

---

Just Spanish: 27% CIU: 1% ERC: 0% PSC / PSOE: 7% ICV - EUiA: 3% Ciutadans: 22% Null votes / blank: 8% Didn’t vote: 11% N = 138

More Spanish than Catalan: 18% PPC: 1% CIU: 0% ERC: 7% PSC / PSOE: 1% ICV - EUiA: 14% Ciutadans: 6% Null votes / blank: 5% Didn’t vote: 11% N = 80

Equally Spanish and Catalan: 52% PPC: 41% CIU: 9% ERC: 61% PSC / PSOE: 45% ICV - EUiA: 62% Ciutadans: 42% Null votes / blank: 53% Didn’t vote: 11% N = 857

More Catalan than Spanish: 2% PPC: 38% CIU: 43% ERC: 18% PSC / PSOE: 34% ICV - EUiA: 0% Ciutadans: 30% Null votes / blank: 19% Didn’t vote: 11% N = 462

Just Catalan: 2% PPC: 18% CIU: 47% ERC: 5% PSC / PSOE: 14% ICV - EUiA: 0% Ciutadans: 6% Null votes / blank: 8% Didn’t vote: 11% N = 245

Don’t know: 0% PPC: 0% CIU: 0% ERC: 0% PSC / PSOE: 2% ICV - EUiA: 3% Ciutadans: 2% Null votes / blank: 1% Didn’t vote: 11% N = 16

No reply: 0% PPC: 1% CIU: 1% ERC: 1% PSC / PSOE: 2% ICV - EUiA: 0% Ciutadans: 6% Null votes / blank: 2% Didn’t vote: 11% N = 29

Total: 100% PPC: 100% CIU: 100% ERC: 100% PSC / PSOE: 100% ICV - EUiA: 100% Ciutadans: 100% Null votes / blank: 100% Didn’t vote: 100% N = 742
These parties got only 7% of the votes of those feeling “Just Catalan” and 12% of those feeling “More Catalan than Spanish”, while these two categories voted massively for CiU (a moderate Catalan nationalist party) or for ERC (the Catalan independence party): 60% and 45% respectively.

A crucial question in any study that includes language is: is the subjects’ first language a stronger or weaker correlate of voting patterns than is their self-professed identity?

Table 4: Distribution of votes in the last regional elections (2006) by language used at home (Idescat 2007; items 9 and 43, vertical percentages)

<p>| Could you tell me for what party or coalition you voted in the last regional elections (November 2006)? (vertical percentages) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PPC</th>
<th>CiU</th>
<th>ERC</th>
<th>PSC / PSOE</th>
<th>ICV - EUiA</th>
<th>Ciutadans</th>
<th>Blank / Null vote</th>
<th>Didn’t vote</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catalan</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish &amp; Catalan</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other replies</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Could you tell me what language you usually speak at home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Could you tell me what language you usually speak at home?</th>
<th>Catalan</th>
<th>Spanish &amp; Catalan</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Other replies</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the discriminatory power of one’s language is also very clear. 48.4% Catalan-speakers vote for the two Catalan nationalist parties, and only 11.3% for the three Spanish parties\(^2\); they participate actively at the voting station (70.8% go to vote).

Only a very small share the vote of Spanish-speakers (8.5%) goes for the two Catalan nationalist parties, while 32.1% vote for the two Spanish parties (and only 49.4% of Spanish-speakers go to vote).

\(^2\) The nine votes cast for “Other parties” have been left out of the table.
In another piece of research, I myself analysed voting patterns by “comarques”, or districts (Strubell 2003). My hypothesis was double: that in areas where the proportion of non-Catalan-born electors is high, the voting patterns will differ from those in areas where the proportion of non-Catalan-born electors is low. Similarly, voting patterns will vary according to the levels of language proficiency, a co-variable of geographical origin, but one that to some extent takes on board the level of integration of the non-Catalan-born subject. I tried to control other independent variables, and thus restricted my analysis to one of the four (multi-seat) provincial circumscriptions, where the lists of candidates would thus be identical. This meant that my corpus of data covered 10 comarques.

I looked at the correlations in two separate elections: the 1999 regional election and the 2000 general election. The source of the linguistic and geographical origin data was the 1996 census, in which everyone was asked whether they could understand, speak, read and/or write Catalan, and where they were born. The time lapsed is not a serious problem, in my view, given that population movements over the period were light, and that language proficiency figures do not change dramatically in so short a period. Let us look first of all at correlations deriving from language proficiency data.

| Summary of correlations (1999 regional election) |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Understand | Can speak | Can read | Can write |
| CiU | 0.91 | 0.93 | 0.74 | 0.19 |
| ERC | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.95 | 0.84 |
| PSC-CpC | -0.61 | -0.65 | -0.54 | -0.32 |
| PP | -0.16 | -0.13 | -0.56 | -0.76 |
| Abstention | -0.67 | -0.71 | -0.75 | -0.28 |

| Summary of correlations (2000 general election) |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Understand | Can speak | Can read | Can write |
| CiU | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 0.34 |
| ERC | 0.54 | 0.57 | 0.96 | 0.78 |
| PSC | -0.41 | -0.43 | -0.43 | -0.39 |
| PP | -0.33 | -0.34 | -0.81 | -0.82 |
Tarragona is a sociologically tricky province: it has both an industrial belt around the capital city, and rural areas where literacy is low, and where the impact of the civil war makes for a relatively conservative population in political terms. This makes interpretation more complex, of course, though basically, it tends to reduce the strength of the statistical correlations. Nevertheless they are there for all to see. Here is a brief outline of the main findings:

a. There are positive correlations for CiU and for ERC (the higher the proportion of people with the language ability, the higher the proportion that voted for these parties).

b. There are negative correlations for PSC and PP (the lower the proportion of people with the language ability, the higher the proportion that voted for these parties). Moreover, the lower the proportion of people with the language ability, the higher the level of abstention.

c. In spite of the various interfering factors already mentioned, some correlations are very high, above 0.80. In the 1999 regional election:
   i. For CiU, the level of those understanding, or being able to speak Catalan, was a crucial variable (0.91 and 0.93 respectively).
   ii. For ERC, the level of those being able to read or write Catalan, was a crucial variable (0.95 and 0.84 respectively).

d. In the 2000 general election:
   i. For CiU and ERC, the same patterns emerged.
   ii. For PP, the level of those being able to read or write Catalan, was a crucial variable (-0.81 and -0.82 respectively). This means that they did noticeably better in areas where the fewest proportion of people could read or write Catalan, and they did worst where the most people could do so.

Statistical devices such as lines of regression allow one to estimate the likely data for missing cases. Thus, for instance, one can extrapolate a straight line in both directions, and estimate (at one end) what the voting outcome would be in a hypothetical *comarca* where everyone had the language competence. I have done this for the ability to read Catalan (which has the highest correlations of the four abilities), and the results of the 1999 Catalan election. Remember the graph refers only to the provincial circumscription of Tarragona.
In such a case, as can be seen at the right-hand end of the graph, CiU would have won more votes than all the other parties; and abstention would have been under a quarter of the electorate. What can we say about the left-hand end? In ordinary circumstances, it is physically impossible for any territory to have 0% reading ability, because of the effect of schooling on at least part of the population. I have chosen 65% because the tapers of several variables seem to peter out at that point: no one would vote for ERC or “Other” parties.

One can chart the data for a hypothetical comarca where everyone can read Catalan (that is, the data down the right-hand side of the graph).

**Table 5. Distribution of votes in the 1999 Catalan elections, in a hypothetical Tarragona comarca in which 100% of the population can read Catalan (the electoral roll is 100%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Hypothetical %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convergència i Unió</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These are substantially skewed, of course, from the overall results for the demarcation (Convergència i Unió, 24·3%; Abstention, 41·1%; Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 6·2%; Socialist and green coalition (PSC-ICV), 20·0%; Others, 2·1%; and Partido Popular, 6·2%.

An extrapolation in the other direction shows that votes for ERC would whittle out in a hypothetical comarca where only 40% of the population could read the language.

We can not only look at extrapolated results by language proficiency: it is worth interesting to look at the hypothetical results, by the proportion of Catalan-born population in each comarca. As before, one can chart the data for a hypothetical comarca where everyone was Catalan-born.

Table 6. Distribution of votes in the 1999 Catalan elections, in a hypothetical Tarragona comarca in which 100% of the population is Catalan-born (the electoral roll is 100%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Hypothetical %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convergència i Unió</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist and green coalition (PSC-ICV)</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Popular</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I am not going to take this issue further, other than to state that overall, the place of birth seems to less correlated with election results than some of the linguistic variables. I hope simply to have shown that reported political behaviour at election time is clearly correlated, in Catalonia, with variables such as place of birth (inside/outside Catalonia) and language proficiency.

Stereotypes
Identity is not only self-attributed but also imposed, in detail, from outside the group, in the form of regional stereotypes. In Spain they are extremely, even aggressively, vivid. In fact, they surprise many foreigners. Catalans are seen as stingy, as mean, for instance. You can find whole sets of jokes about the Catalans, on the web: just look for “chistes” and “Catalanes” using Google.

“What do Catalans do when they’re cold?”
“They sit beside the stove.”
“And what do Catalans do when they’re VERY cold?”
“Then they light the stove!”

These stereotypes are so powerful that they crop up in unexpected places. When a Catalan was listed as a possible successor to the leader of one of the main Spanish parties, on the negative side of his traits was quite simply that he was a Catalan. The last Catalan prime minister (perhaps the only one, in fact) made his fame as a general, but was assassinated, while still in power, in 1870: Joan Prim.

As is well known, politics have had an enormous impact on the main trait of the Catalan people, their language. The Franco regime not only used just Spanish: Catalan (and Basque and Galician) were banned even from schools, for over 30 years. The use of languages other than Spanish was seen as anti-patriotic (Mar-Molinero 1997: 12; Strubell 1999).

Regional stereotypes have been studied several times (Rodríguez Sanabra 1963; Sangrador 1981, 1996; Chacón Fuertes 1986). Chacón (1986), for instance, studied the stereotypes shared by people from Madrid. Catalans were described by over half his sample as tacaños” (stingy, mean), “orgullosos (proud)”, “cerrados” (closed), “separatistas” (separatists), and (at last something positive!) “trabajadores” (hard-working). On the other hand, Andalusians were seen by over half of the same sample as 1 “juerguistas” (revellers, binge-lovers), “alegres” (jolly, playful, fun); “abiertos” (open), “exagerados” (exaggerated), “graciosos” (funny), “hospitalarios” (hospitalable), and “charlatanes” = charlatans. Only the last adjective of the seven is clearly negative. Galicians were described as “supersticiosos”, the only adjective chosen by half the sample. The Basques were seen as “fuertes” (strong) and “separatistas (separatists)”. The Madrid sample described “Spaniards” as a whole as “hospitalarios” (hospitalable) and “abiertos” (open), traits also attributed to the Andalusians. Finally, a sample of people from outside Madrid saw “Madrileños” as “chulos” (insolent, pimps), “abiertos” (open); and “hospitalarios” (hospitalable, welcoming).

As you can see, therefore, Catalans really evoke a strong stereotype, which is both negative and widely shared not only by Madrileños (as seen in this study) but in
general across Spain. In terms of attraction-repulsion, Sangrador (1996) showed that the Basques and, even more markedly, the Catalans were the two least positively scored in his sample (in all seventeen regions, interviewees’ scores for their own region were excluded from the calculation). The Catalans were well below all the others. A similar result was reported by Rodríguez & Moya (1998), working with an Andalusian sample.

Sangrador sums up his findings as follows: “It is worth underlining that the attitude towards Catalans is, systematically the lowest in the autonomous regions studied here, even among Basques and Valencians […]”; so much is it the case that feeling towards Catalans is
systematically lower than that expressed towards Europeans.” (1996: 178. Author’s translation)

“As far as the Catalans are concerned, their image is probably the most interesting one in the analysis, for a strange bipolarity emerges: a mixture of positive traits (hardworking, resourceful) with others that are clearly negative […] in the field of psychological traits: stinginess, pride, selfishness, antipathy…). Paradoxically, the image obtained of Catalans is much closer to that of Europeans, which implicitly places them further from Spaniards” (1996: 179)

Strange as it may seem, these stereotypes have a real impact on behaviour. Most Catalan businessmen wishing to sell their products in the rest of Spain would never dream of putting the word “Cataluña” on the labels of their products, or their full address in Catalan. Let alone label products in Spain’s four languages.

A final word on stereotypes. Without wishing to sound paranoid, it is at least a strange coincidence that only since the Aznar era (to my knowledge) have a number of writers of international bestselling Enligsh-language novels cast Catalans in a negative light. Tom Clancy’s *Op-Center: Balance of Power* (1998) was the subject of an interesting article by Thompson (2004). For its part, Stephen Baxter’s *Flood* (2008) starts with the liberation of the protagonists from a “Christian extremist” Catalonian terrorist bunker in Barcelona after five years of captivity, in 2016.

**Conclusion**

Let us return to this title of this paper: “‘Bulls and donkeys. National identity and symbols in Catalonia and Spain’. It is clear from many studies, and even by casual observation, that the use of Catalan is a strong marker of identity for Spaniards. Nowadays few would claim out loud that Catalan is publicly used (even when overheard) as an offensive way of establishing an ethnolinguistic distance. But many across Spain react to its use quite differently to the use of, say, Portuguese. Catalans are still asked why they speak the language to their children… But language choice among Catalans is a double-bind situation. Describing the situation in Catalonia itself some years ago, Webber & Strubell (1991: 23) wrote about

“… the tendency to equate 'non-Catalan' with monolingual, which sometimes makes Catalans respond in Castilian when addressed by a person speaking Catalan with a non-Catalan accent. Such a response, which can be termed 'ethnolinguistic accommodation’, is often experienced by those learning Catalan as a second language who regard it
(understandably, although incorrectly) as aggressive and exclusive. The difficulties for language-planners are exacerbated by the fact that many Catalans switch languages in such circumstances automatically and are therefore unconscious of their own behaviour.”

So indeed, the almost automatic shift from Catalan to Spanish can also be viewed as a gesture of in-group exclusivity. Either way, it would seem, Catalan-speakers are faced with dilemmas. There seem to be very deep-rooted stereotype of Catalans that they cannot cast off (by the very nature of attitudes and their resilience to change). But are such examples of prejudice new? By no means. On the three occasions Catalonia strived to achieve (some level of) home rule in the 20th century, in some parts of Spain that was heated opposition (going so far as to making calls for boycotts of Catalan products). But the problem goes far back in time. Toni Strubell, in a personal communication (2005)34, describes how in García Cárcel’s (1985) opinion, King Philip IV of Castile devised a cultural policy explicitly designed to stir Castilian public opinion against Catalonia in the build-up to the so-called Guerra dels Segadors (1640-1659). The campaign consisted basically of paying Castilian playwrights to include immoral Catalan characters in this plays, and according to García Cárcel this happened regularly in the works of a wide range of authors. The effectiveness of the theatre, a very lively sociocultural feature of the 17th century, and with highly acclaimed playwrights, was intended to ease the way up to a war against Catalonia, a war that the chancellor, Count-Duke Olivares, had apparently strongly recommended to him.

A number of measurable behavioural and cognitive traits are clearly correlated with identity. The field is wide open for comparative field research. I am sure that the vigour and passion (and some level of ridicule) with which national and regional identities, and political aims, are felt in Spain are somewhat alien to most Britons (though the world over, people from the neighbouring village tend to be regarded as odd in one way or another…) and will be a strong stimulus for research on this fascinating subject.

Allow me to thank the Society, once again, for having invited me to speak at this Conference.

Bibliography


FOOTNOTES

1 The author is grateful to the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya for a travel bursary to attend the 2007 Anglo-Catalan Conference in Abertawe.
3 Torrent points out that Catalonia has six times less mileage of toll-free motorways than do the two regions of Castile, while it has four times more mileage of toll motorways than do Madrid o Andalusia.


6 Source: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toro_de_Osborne

7 Ley 25/1988, de 29 de julio, de Carreteras.

8 Ref.: Id Cendoj: 28079130031997100322. Ref. 652/1994 . 30 December 1997. http://www.poderjudicial.es/jurisprudencia/pdf/28079130031997100322.pdf?formato=pdf&K2DocKey=E:Sentencias/20030912/28079130031997100322.xml@sent_supremo&query=%28Os borne%29%3CAND%3E%28%3CYESNO%3E%28fecha_resolucion+%3E%3D+19971201%29%29%3CAND%3E%28%3CYESNO%3E%28fecha_resolucion+%3E%3D+19971231%29%29

9 Author’s translation. The full extract is as follows:

Objetivamente considerada, es evidente que la figura no transmite ya ningún mensaje directo al observador. No hay leyenda, ni gráfico que indique la identidad de un producto o servicio, pues la expresa referencia que con anterioridad hacía a un determinado tipo de brandy se ha hecho desaparecer. En estos momentos, para la generalidad de los ciudadanos que la contemplan, aun habiendo conocido su primitivo significado, ha dejado de ser el emblema de una marca, para convertirse en algo decorativo, integrado en el paisaje. Aunque en forma indirecta pueda recordar a algunos el símbolo de una firma comercial, el primer impacto visual que en la mayoría produce es el de una atractiva silueta, superpuesta al entorno, que más que inducir al consumo, recrea la vista, rememora “la fiesta”, destaca la belleza del fuerte animal.


11 See also translation and photograph: http://www.racocatala.cat/articles/4691


14 If anyone doubts the political and identity-based nature of the initiative, please visit http://www.burrocatala.com/.

15 http://www.flickr.com/photos/suevo/204356308/
Article 8: Se prohíbe la utilización en la bandera de España de cualesquiera símbolos o siglas de partidos políticos, sindicatos, asociaciones o entidades privadas. Ley 39/1981, de 28 de octubre, por la que se regula el uso de la bandera de España y el de otras banderas y enseñas (BOE núm. 271, de 12 de noviembre). http://www.lamoncloa.es/Espana/ElEstado/Simbolos/Legislacion/BanderaLey39-81.htm

Article 4: En las Comunidades Autónomas, cuyos Estatutos reconozcan una bandera propia, ésta se utilizará juntamente con la bandera de España en todos los edificios públicos civiles del ámbito territorial de aquélla, en los términos de lo dispuesto en el artículo sexto de la presente ley.

Article 10

1. Los ultrajes y ofensas a la bandera de España y a las contempladas en el artículo 4 del presente texto, se castigarán conforme a lo dispuesto en las leyes...

2. Los ultrajes y ofensas a las banderas a que se refiere el artículo tercero de esta Ley, se considerarán siempre como cometidas con publicidad a los efectos de lo dispuesto en el citado artículo 123 del Código Penal.

There is a very short sequence of him with the Catalan and Spanish flags, at the end of a youtube film: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoEJGiHQafI [last accessed 31/1/2009]

“There was no space, physical or moral, for the Spanish flag at the top of Everest. Spain should understand that we cannot easily bear in our hearts the flag that replaced ours by force.”


http://www.seleccions.cat/home/home.asp

http://www.keithm.utvinternet.ie/Andorra.htm

a. PPC. The Partido Popular (People’s party) is a Spain-wide conservative party, which was in power from 1996 to 2004 (despite doing poorly in Catalonia)
b. CiU. Convergencia i Unió is a coalition of two moderate nationalist parties, the liberal Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya and the Christian democrat Unió Democràtica de Catalunya. It held power in Catalonia for six straight legislatures, from 1980 to 2003, when despite winning, it was toppled by a coalition of leftist parties.
c. ERC. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya is the only independence party in the Catalan Parliament. It took third place in the last elections, and belongs to the current Catalan government.
d. PSC / PSOE. The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya is the Catalan Socialist party, which won power in Catalonia in 2003 thanks to its heading a post-electoral coalition of leftist parties.
e. ICV – EUiA. Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds and Esquerra Unida i Alternativa - is the coalition of Green and former Communist parties, and has been the minority partner in the last two Catalan governments.

f. Ciutadans. Partido de la ciudadanía. Founded recently as a purportedly “non-nationalist” party, it is new to the Parliament. It opponents regard it as a Spanish nationalist party.

26 Partido Popular (PPC), the Socialists (PSC/PSOE) and Ciutadans. Partido de la Ciudadania.

27 Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.


30 In 1999 they formed a coalition with IC-Verds.

31 Author’s translation. Note that the first group of traits are related to the “status” factor, and the second group, to the “solidarity” factor.

32 Thompson writes: “Mackall's assassination is a carefully coordinated effort by the Basque Deputy Serrador and a group of wealthy Catalan businessmen to disrupt American diplomacy. The goal of these industrialists is to initiate an economic collapse in Castile that will allow Catalonia to take over the central government; however, their plans are frustrated when...”. Significantly, he notes that “Having previously published translations of many of Clancy's novels, the editors at Planeta must have felt obliged to issue a translation of Balance of Power faced with the demand for Clancy's work among Spanish readers; yet, given the contentiousness of this particular story, they assumed responsibility for modifying aspects of the plot that appeared to exceed the boundaries of conscientious representation”...He refers to an article by Justo Navarro (in Babelia, the Saturday literary supplement of El País, February 27, 1999). “In several instances, the translator tones down statements that appear to exaggerate the state of affairs among autonomous regions”.

33 Indeed, this was an offshoot of the paper I gave on the subject at the Anglo-Catalan Society conference in 1986.

34 Toni Strubell, Sunday, 30th October 2005 18:39h.

“In several instances, the translator tones down statements that appear to exaggerate the state of affairs among autonomous regions”.

35 In 1999 they formed a coalition with IC-Verds.

36 Author’s translation. Note that the first group of traits are related to the “status” factor, and the second group, to the “solidarity” factor.

37 Thompson writes: “Mackall's assassination is a carefully coordinated effort by the Basque Deputy Serrador and a group of wealthy Catalan businessmen to disrupt American diplomacy. The goal of these industrialists is to initiate an economic collapse in Castile that will allow Catalonia to take over the central government; however, their plans are frustrated when...”. Significantly, he notes that “Having previously published translations of many of Clancy's novels, the editors at Planeta must have felt obliged to issue a translation of Balance of Power faced with the demand for Clancy's work among Spanish readers; yet, given the contentiousness of this particular story, they assumed responsibility for modifying aspects of the plot that appeared to exceed the boundaries of conscientious representation”...He refers to an article by Justo Navarro (in Babelia, the Saturday literary supplement of El País, February 27, 1999). “In several instances, the translator tones down statements that appear to exaggerate the state of affairs among autonomous regions”.

38 Indeed, this was an offshoot of the paper I gave on the subject at the Anglo-Catalan Society conference in 1986.
obres, cosa que García Cárcel diu que va ocórrer amb regularitat en una ampla gamma d'autors. L'efectivitat del teatre, fenomen sociocultural molt viu amb autors molt prestigiats al XVII, va fer, sens dubte, que el ei tingués més fàcil justificar una guerra contra Catalunya que el seu principal canceller, el Comte-Duc d'Olivares, li havia recomanat vivament."